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INFORMED CONSENT AND THE SCOPE OF A PHYSICIAN'S
DUTY OF DISCLOSURE
I. INTRODUCTION
When Justice Benjamin Cardozo stated that "[e]very human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body," he described the basic concept behind the
doctrine of informed consent and a physician's duty of disclosure.1
However, the fundamental notion of a person's right to medical autono-
my that Justice Cardozo described has become clouded with issues that
he most likely never contemplated. 2
The purpose of this note is to explore the nature of the doctrine of
informed consent as it has evolved in relation to the scope of what a
physician must tell a patient in order to achieve full disclosure. Emerg-
ing from this exploration are the questions: how much information do
patients require before they are truly informed, and what limits will be
placed on the kinds of information a physician is required to provide?
This note will examine informed consent beyond the traditional
notion of a physician's failure to fully inform a patient of all medical
risks and cover the scope of what, if any, personal or financial informa-
tion a physician must provide to patients in order to achieve a truly
"informed" consent. Section II will provide a general background of
the doctrine of informed consent, including the status of informed
consent in North Dakota. Section III will explore the issues emerging in
informed consent, including the physician's duty to disclose personal
information, such as drug or alcohol use, health condition, or medical
experience, and the physician's duty to disclose financial interests in a
patient's care. Section IV will examine legislative responses to these
issues. Finally, section V will discuss the potential implications of these
issues.
1. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). When Justice Cardozo
wrote this opinion, he was a New York appellate court judge.
2. Judith F. Daar, Informed Consent: Defining Limits Through Therapeutic Parameters, 16
WHITnER L. REV. 187, 208 (1995). The author notes:
[T]he goals of informed consent appear to be shifting away from providing adequate
medical information for patients to gain control of their health care and toward revealing
an assortment of medical and nonmedical details which allow patients to contemplate the
risks associated with treatment as well as those risks posed by their physicians.
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II. INFORMED CONSENT: THE BASICS
In Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees,3 a
California appellate court first used the term "informed consent" to
describe a physician's obligation to disclose facts that are necessary for a
patient to consent to treatment. 4 The general rule for informed consent
is that a physician must, except in certain situations, obtain the consent of
a patient before treatment. 5 However, mere consent to treatment does not
suffice: the patient must receive a clear and honest explanation of the
proposed treatment so that he or she can give an informed consent.6
A. THE CAUSE OF ACTION
An informed consent action is most often framed either as an action
for battery or as an action for negligence. 7 Early cases utilized the tort
of battery based on the fact that the physician had committed an inten-
tional and unauthorized touching of the patient. 8 In a battery action, a
patient does not have to establish the causation element necessary to a
negligence action, nor do damages need to be proven. 9 Therefore, the
patient does not have to demonstrate that he or she would not have
consented to a procedure if properly informed.10
Informed consent cases today generally ground their complaint on
a negligence action.11  If a physician obtains consent to perform a
3. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
4. Id. at 181. The court stated that a physician should recognize that every "patient presents a
separate problem, that the patient's mental and emotional condition is important and in certain cases
may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be
employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent." Id. (citations
omitted).
5. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 187 (1999) (noting that the
theory of informed consent arises from a patient's right of self-determination and the fiduciary
relationship between the patient and the physician).
6. Id.; see also Rizzo v. Schiller, 445 S.E.2d 153, 155-65 (Va. 1994) (noting that consent that is
not informed amounts to no consent at all).
7. Risk Analysis: Informed Consent, Hosp. RISK CONTROL (ECRI, Plymouth Meeting, Pa.), Nov.
1993, at 5-6.
8. S. SANDY SANBiAR ET AL., LEGAL MEDICINE 268 (4th ed. 1998). Cases for battery usually involve
those in which "(1) the patient consented to one procedure and another was actually performed, (2)
the physician failed to disclose a disability that was certain to result from a proposed nonemergency
procedure, or (3) the physician performed an experimental procedure without advising the patient of
its experimental nature." Id.; see also Risk Analysis: Informed Consent, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that
another ground for an informed consent battery action exists when a surgeon, other than the one the
patient approved, performs a consented-to operation).
9. Risk Analysis: Informed Consent, supra note 7, at 5-6.
10. See Gouse v. Cassel, 615 A.2d 331, 333-34 (Pa. 1992) (holding that the patient need only es-
tablish that he was deprived of information a reasonable patient would have considered significant to a
decision for treatment).
. 11. See Risk Analysis: Informed Consent, supra note 7, at 5-6 (noting that Pennsylvania still
characterizes a physician's failure to obtain a patient's informed consent as battery).
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procedure, but the patient is not adequately informed, the patient has not
given informed consent. 12 In a negligence action against a physician for
failure to obtain informed consent, a patient must establish the following
elements: duty to inform, breach of that duty, causation, and resulting
injury.13 Alternatively, some patients frame their complaint as one for
fraud or negligent misrepresentation, if the physician failed to disclose
information about himself or herself that the patient believed would have
been relevant to treatment decisions.14
1. Exceptions to the Duty to Disclose
Generally, a duty exists on the part of a physician to disclose a
patient's choices and the risks associated with those choices. 15 The
doctrine of informed consent has its foundation in the tort of battery,
which recognizes that people should be free from a violation of their
bodily integrity.1 6 Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospitall7 first
most clearly invoked the idea that a patient has a fundamental right to
make his or her medical decisions.18 The past thirty years have seen a
change in the notion of informed consent because people's readiness to
allow physicians to be in control of all medical decisions has declined. 19
Correspondingly, the requirement that a patient give consent to treatment
has broadened to the requirement that the consent be "informed." 20
The law, however, recognizes some general exceptions to a physi-
cian's duty to obtain informed consent.21 For example, a physician may
treat an unconscious patient or a patient otherwise unable to consent
when the potential harm from a failure to treat outweighs the potential
danger of the treatment. 22 A physician does not have to inform a patient
12. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 187 (1999).
13. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979). Because a plaintiff must prove duty,
breach of duty, causation, and injury in a negligence action of any type, these elements are not unique
to informed consent cases. See generally 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 82 (1989 & Supp. 2000).
14. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 330 (Md. 1993).
15. Cobb v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972).
16. ARNOLD J. Rosorr, TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW § 17.01(1)(a) (2000). In battery, a person
is held liable for the harmful offensive touching of another. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18
(1965). In an informed consent action based on this principle, the physician is held liable because his
or her failure to disclose the necessary information prevented the patient from truly giving consent to
the procedure or treatment. Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health
Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, Part IV.A.I (1999). When the physician then has
physical contact with the patient, that contact is an impermissible touching. Id.
17. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
18. Id. at 93; see also Rosorr, supra note 16, § 17.01(l)(c).
19. RosoFF, supra note 16, § 17.01(2)(a).
20. Id. § 17.02.
21. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
22. See id. (noting that a physician should attempt to seek consent from a relative if time and
circumstances allow).
NOTE
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
of risks considered common knowledge or those of which the patient
already has knowledge. 23 Patients may waive their rights to a full disclo-
sure by requesting that the physician not inform them of the attendant
risks of a treatment. 24
A physician also can withhold information if he or she feels that dis-
closing the risks of a treatment would cause a "threat of detriment" and
hinder the patient's treatment. 25 If a physician feels that presenting treat-
ment information to the patient would cause stress, illness, or otherwise
damage his or her well-being, the physician has the right to withhold that
information.2 6 For example, in Nishi v. Hartwell,27 physicians did not
tell their patient about the risks of a thoracic aortography, a diagnostic
procedure used to detect an aneurysm. 28 A reaction to the dye used in
the procedure left the patient paralyzed below his waist.29 The physi-
cians claimed that telling a frightened patient, who suffered from heart
disease and high blood pressure, about the risks of the procedure would
have frightened him, and perhaps caused more problems than those
suffered. 30
The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the physician's failure to
disclose the risks of the procedure fell within a therapeutic privilege, and
therefore, the lower court was correct in granting the physicians' motion
to dismiss.31 The patient's wife also claimed that if her husband was not
in a condition for the physicians to tell him about the risks of his proce-
dure, they should have told her. 32 However, the court noted that the
physicians owed no duty of disclosure to the spouse of a patient because
23. SANBAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 267.
24. Id.
25. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit cautions, however, that this privilege, if not restrained, has the potential to "devour the dis-
closure rule itself." Id.; see also SANBAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 267 (stating that for a physician to
utilize what some courts call "the therapeutic privilege" or "professional discretion," he or she must
have established knowledge that the patient would be excessively alarmed if completely informed of
the risks).
26. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.
27. 473 P.2d 116 (Haw. 1970), overruled in part by Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489 (Haw. 1995).
28. Id. at 118. The dismissal of the complaint in Nishi was also affirmed on the grounds that the
patient did not meet his burden under a physician-orientated disclosure standard of introducing evi-
dence of what a physician in the community normally disclosed to a patient regarding a procedure.
Carr, 904 P.2d at 494. This portion of the opinion was overruled when the Hawaii Supreme Court
adopted the patient-oriented disclosure standard. Id. at 499. However, under the therapeutic privilege
doctrine, in cases like Nishi, the physician-based standard would still apply because the physician must
use his or her professional judgment to determine the patient's best interest. Carr, 904 P.2d at 498.
29. Nishi, 473 P.2d at 118.
30. Id. at 120.
31. Id. at 121.
32. Id. at 122.
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the duty emerges from the relationship between the physician and the
patient and is owed to the patient alone.33
2. Disclosure Standards
Jurisdictions use either a physician-based, patient-based, or hybrid
standard of disclosure to determine what information a physician needs
to disclose to his or her patients. 34 Under the physician-based standard,
the court looks to what risks the reasonable physician would disclose to
the patient.35 The court will judge whether a disclosure was adequate by
examining whether common practice in the community required the dis-
closure of a particular risk.36 Under this standard, a patient usually must
present expert testimony to demonstrate that a physician, following ac-
ceptable medical practice, would have disclosed the injury-causing risk.37
Under the patient-based standard, a physician must disclose those
risks to patient that a reasonable patient would consider material to
decisions about medical treatment. 38 A patient should find it easier to
recover for a physician's failure to disclose personal information under
this standard because the patient can argue that a reasonable patient
would find this information material. 39 Because this standard does not
focus on expert testimony,40 it also avoids the difficulty that some
patients face in trying to obtain physicians to testify against other
physicians. 4
The hybrid standard of disclosure encompasses those jurisdictions
who have not clearly articulated a standard or who use a combination of
33. Id.
34. See TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW: S TATE BY STATE A NALYSIS OF APPROACHES TO INFORMED
CONSENT 17A app. (2000) (classifying the states according to one of three disclosure standards:
physician-based, patient-based, or a hybrid standard.)
35. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106, decision clarified on denial of reh'g by 354 P.2d 670
(Kan. 1960).
36. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
37. Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 699 (Minn. 1977), rev'd, 295 N.W.2d 638 (Minn.
1980). The court modified its prior opinion by stating that the disclosure duty extends beyond dis-
closing significant risks to include professional competence and patient self-determination. Cornfeldt,
295 N.W.2d at 640 n.2.
38. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786-87.
39. Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from their Physicians, 55
U. PrrT. L. REV. 291, 344 (1994).
40. Ketchup v. Howard, 247 Ga. App. 54, 62 (2000). However, under this standard, expert testi-
mony may be needed to demonstrate that the risk that produced the injury is one that the physician
knew or should have known about. Id. Under this patient-based standard, expert testimony is general-
ly not used to establish a physician's duty to disclose. Id. Rather, the jury decides "whether a reasona-
ble person in the patient's position would have considered the risk significant in making the decision to
have or reject the proposed treatment." Id.
41. RosoFF, supra note 16, § 17.03(3)(a); see also Winkjer v. Herr, 277 N.W.2d 579, 589 (N.D.
1979) ("We are well aware of the contention that the reluctance of the members of the medical
profession to testify against a fellow physician makes the search for a medical expert very difficult
and nearly impossible in some cases.").
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physician and patient disclosure standards and, therefore, cannot be
categorized as one or the other.
42
3. The Connection Between the Injury and Failure to
Disclose
For the causation element, courts use either an objective test or a sub-
jective test to determine whether a patient would have refused treatment
if the physician had made an adequate disclosure. 43 The majority of
jurisdictions follow an objective test under which a plaintiff must prove
that a reasonable person would not have undergone the procedure/ treat-
ment if he or she was properly informed. 44 A minority of jurisdictions
use a subjective test, which examines whether or not the individual
patient would have chosen the procedure/treatment if he or she had been
fully informed. 45
4. Injury
Finally, the patient must suffer an injury from the risk that the
physician failed to disclose. 46 If the undisclosed risk fails to materialize,
the patient has not established the final element of the negligence
cause of action. 47 Most informed consent cases involve physical in-
juries, 48 but claims for wrongful death, 49 emotional injuries,50 and loss of
consortium 51 have also been asserted.
42. Rosoi, supra note 16, § 17.03(4).
43. See SANBAR ET At., supra note 8, at 268.
44. RosoF, supra note 16, § 17.03(2)(b)(ii); e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
45. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979). The court criticizes the Canterbury
Court's "reasonable man" standard because it denies protection to a patient who would have chosen
not to have a treatment if a reasonable person would have chosen the treatment after receiving proper
disclosure. Id. at 558-59. To the Scott Court, this reasoning unacceptably hampers a patient's right to
self-determination. Id. at 559.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 172 (Cal. 1957) (malpractice
action for paralysis).
49. Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213, 214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (wrongful death of claimants' son).
50. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 330 (Md. 1993) (emotional distress due to exposure to the
AIDS virus).
51. Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 778 (Ga. 2000) (the patient's
spouse claimed loss of consortium).
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B. INFORMED CONSENT LAW IN NORTH DAKOTA
In 1977, North Dakota passed a statute 52 in reaction to medical mal-
practice claims in an attempt to limit the liability of health care provid-
ers. 53 Informed consent was defined as "consent to a procedure based
on information which would ordinarily be provided to the patient under
like circumstances by health care providers." 54 By this definition the
statute created a physician-based disclosure standard.55 Because the stat-
ute changed the test for failure to consent to treatment from a subjective
to an objective standard, the information that should be disclosed to a
patient would be determined by the custom of health care providers. 56
The North Dakota Supreme Court ultimately held the chapter as a whole
unconstitutional .57
The North Dakota Supreme Court has not ruled whether the disclo-
sure standard should be judged based on "the custom of the physician
practicing in the community" or based on what is "reasonable under
the circumstances." 58 In Winkjer v. Herr,59 the court considered the
extent of a physician's duty to disclose a patient's treatment choices, the
associated risks, and the standard by which that duty should be
measured. 60 As a treatment for glaucoma, the physician prescribed a
52. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 26-40.1 (1977) (held unconstitutional in Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d
125, 126 (N.D. 1978)).
53. Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 127, 130.
54. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-40.1-02(5) (held unconstitutional).
55. Id. § 26-40.1-05 (held unconstitutional). Before a patient may recover damages in an action
based on failure to obtain informed consent, the patient must establish "that a reasonably prudent per-
son in the claimant's position would not have undergone the treatment had he been properly informed
and that the performance of the treatment was the proximate cause of the injury and damages
claimed." Id. Through this language, the statute also created an objective standard by which to judge
the causation element of an informed consent action. See supra Part II.A.3.
56. See Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 126, 133. The legislature attempted to contain the applicability
of this chapter to those patients who consented to its provisions by signing a form. Id. However, if a
patient did not consent, the physician did not have to provide treatment. Id. at 133-34. Therefore, if a
physician denied treatment, the patient could choose "to suffer or die of his ailment or to travel outside
the State to obtain medical attention." Id. at 134. The court considered the harshness of these choices
in its decision to find the statute unconstitutional. Id.
57. Id. at 138. The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the entire Act violated due process on
several grounds: it was applied to only one category of health care providers (physicians), consent
was imposed under duress and in emergencies, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was limited, and the
collateral source doctrine was nearly abolished. Id. at 137. Under the collateral source doctrine, pay-
ments made to an injured party by a third party, or a collateral source, will not reduce a tort defen-
dant's liability to the injured party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920-A (1965). Thus, if an
injured person recovers under his or her own insurance policy, the tort defendant's liability will not be
reduced correspondingly. Id.
58. Lemke v. United States, 557 F. Supp. 1205, 1212 (D.N.D. 1983) (quoting Winkjer v. Herr,
277 N.W.2d 579, 587-88 (N.D. 1979)).
59. 277 N.W.2d 579 (N.D. 1979).
60. Id. at 587.
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phospholine iodine eye solution for the patient. 6 1 The patient later
developed cataracts in both eyes, a condition he blamed on the eye
solution.62 The court examined the duty of disclosure both on the basis
of what a reasonable medical practitioner would disclose and on the basis
of what risks a patient would consider material.
6 3
However, the court declined to decide which standard to adopt and
instead decided the case on the basis of lack of expert testimony. 64 The
court noted that a physician has no duty to inform a patient of extremely
rare risks or of risks that the physician does not know exist. 6 5 In this
case, the patient failed to provide expert testimony to refute the physi-
cian's expert witnesses who testified that developing cataracts from using
that strength phospholine iodine for less than a year was highly unlikely
and actually unheard of.66 Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's
granting of summary judgment. 67
In Wasem v. Laskowski,68 decided after the Medical Malpractice Act
was found unconstitutional, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a
lower court's jury instructions on informed consent that suggested a
patient-based disclosure standard. 69 Another portion of the instructions
indicated that what physicians in similar circumstances would disclose
is "relevant and material" to whether proper disclosure was made. 70
However, the court specifically stated that jury instructions must be
examined as a whole. 7 1 Thus, an emphasis on one specific portion of the
instructions may not be wise, especially given the court's later failure to
decide, in Winkjer, which standard to adopt.
72
61. Id. at 582.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 588-89. The North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged the "persuasive reasoning"
in Canterbury that "the test for determining whether a particular peril must be divulged is its materiali-
ty to the patient's decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision must be unmasked." Id. at 588
(quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
64. Id. at 588-89. The court noted that generally expert testimony plays a more important role in
determining the disclosure standard for the reasonable physician. Id. at 587-88. However, when the
medical questions fall beyond the understanding of laymen, expert testimony is needed. Id. at 588.
65. Id. at 588. The court stated that "there is no need to disclose risks of little consequence, those
that are extremely remote, or those that are common knowledge as inherent in the treatment." Id.
(citing Cobb v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972)).
66. Id. at 588-89.
67. Id. at 589.
68. 274 N.W.2d 219 (N.D. 1979).
69. Id. at 226. The jury instructions stated in part:
The duty of a doctor to inform the patient is measured by a standard of reasonableness.
The doctor must make such disclosures as appear necessary to enable a reasonable per-
son, under the same or similar circumstances confronting the patient at the time of the dis-
closure to intelligently exercise his right to consent or to refuse the procedure proposed.
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 222-23.
72. Winkjer v. Herr, 277 N.W.2d 579, 588-89 (N.D. 1979).
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The North Dakota Supreme Court has also declined to decide
whether the objective or subjective test should be used in determining
causation for informed consent actions. 73 In Buzzell v. Libi,74 a patient
consented to have her right ear operated on, but the consent form mis-
takenly listed her left ear. 75 When the surgeon operated, he found no
sign of the suspected problem in her right ear, but after examining her
left ear, he operated on a problem he subsequently discovered. 76 Al-
though the court found that the physician had breached his duty of dis-
closure, the patient's action failed to establish the causation element.77
Causation was lacking because the patient admitted that had the physi-
cian recommended the left-ear surgery she would have agreed to it.78
The court noted that a patient "has no complaint if he would have
submitted to the treatment if the physician had complied with his duty
and informed him of the risks." 79 The court, therefore, never reached a
conclusion as to whether the objective or subjective test would apply in
determining whether a patient would have consented to the procedure. 80
Currently, North Dakota statutory law concerning informed consent
involves very specific situations, such as consent for abortion,8 l consent
for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) testing, 82 and consent issues
involving those individuals, such as minors and the incapacitated, who
are unable to give consent. 83
Thus, the North Dakota Supreme Court has not explicitly stated
whether it will follow a physician or patient-based standard of dis-
closure.84 However, based on the affirmation of jury instructions using a
patient-based standard 85 and the fact that expert testimony is not re-
73. Buzzell v. Libi, 340 N.W.2d 36, 41 n.3 (N.D. 1983).
74. 340 N.W.2d 36 (N.D. 1983).
75. Id. at 38. The court noted that even though the patient had signed a consent form for surgery
listing her left ear, that consent was void because the physician had never discussed surgery on that
ear or told the patient of the risks. Id. at 40. The physician was aware at the time of the surgery that
the consent form mistakenly listed the left ear instead of the right. Id. at 38.
76. Id. at 38.
77. Id. at 40-41.
78. Id. at 41.
79. Id. (citing Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979)).
80. Id. at 41 n.3.
81. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02 (1997) (listing definitions under the abortion control act,
including a definition for "informed consent"); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03 (1997)
(consent to abortion).
82. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-07.5-02 (Supp. 1999) (informed consent for HIV testing or
disclosure).
83. See id. § 23-12-13 (Supp. 1999) (persons authorized to provide informed consent to health
care for incapacitated persons).
84. Lemke v. United States, 557 F. Supp. 1205, 1212 (D.N.D. 1983) (citing Winkjer v. Herr, 277
N.W.2d 579, 587-88 (N.D. 1979)).
85. Wasem v. Laskowski, 274 N.W.2d 219, 226 (N.D. 1979).
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quired for informed consent cases,8 6 North Dakota courts would likely
follow a patient-based standard.8 7
III. INFORMED CONSENT: ISSUES FOR TODAY
Today, the doctrine of informed consent and the duty of disclosure
have broadened beyond the traditional elements to include information
about the provider of the medical care.88 This expansion poses some
dilemmas for caregivers as they determine the relevant facts to disclose
to a patient.8 9 Ultimately, the changing requirements of the duty of
disclosure have the potential to change the way society thinks about
informed consent.90
A. DUTY TO DISCLOSE PERSONAL INFORMATION
An issue that has recently arisen in the area of informed consent
involves whether physicians have a duty to disclose personal information
that arguably might affect a patient's consent to treatment. 91 Examples
of the areas of personal information that patients have claimed a right to
know include a physician's substance abuse, 92 Human Immunodeficien-
cy Virus (HIV) or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
status, 93 and a physician's qualifications. 94
1. Drug and Alcohol Use
The question of whether a physician's use or abuse of drugs or
alcohol can void a patient's consent to an otherwise informed course of
treatment poses interesting and wide-reaching possibilities, if expanded
to other professions. 95 If a court finds that drug or alcohol use by a
86. See N.D. CErrr. CODE § 28-01-46 (Supp. 1999) (expert opinion is required to maintain an
action based upon medical negligence except in obvious cases and in cases based on a lack of
informed consent).
87. See generally TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW: STATE BY STATE ANALYSIS OF APPROACHES TO
INFORmED CONSENT 17A app. (2000).
88. See Bobinski, supra note 39, at 312.
89. Risk Analysis: Informed Consent, supra note 7, at 2-3.
90. See ROSOFF, supra note 16, § 17.01(2)(d) (noting that developments, such as the changing
ways health care is financed and the changes in the type and amount of information available re-
garding treatments and health care providers, "have the potential to unleash a new round of doctrinal
growth in the law governing informed consent").
91. See, e.g., Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213, 216-17 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that the
informed consent doctrine does not encompass the duty of a physician to disclose his alcoholism).
92. Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777 (Ga. 2000).
93. Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
94. Johnson by Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996).
95. Albany, 528 S.E.2d at 782 & n.19. The Georgia Supreme Court examines a hypothetical in
which an attorney, whose physician diagnoses him as a binge drinker, might be required to disclose
this fact to his clients even though his drinking does not affect his work. Id. at n. 19. Going further, the
court contemplates whether the attorney would have to disclose his habits to a client who opposed
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physician does not void consent, an injured patient has other recovery
opportunities.96 Physicians can still be held accountable through tradi-
tional malpractice claims if it can be demonstrated that because of
alcohol or drug use a patient was harmed during treatment.97
In examining whether certain undisclosed physician characteristics,
like substance abuse, should provide a patient with grounds for an in-
formed consent action, a sl ippery slope argument easily takes shape:
what would be the limits of the personal characteristics an individual
would have to disclose in a professional relationship? 98 The Georgia
Supreme Court noted, in reversing a lower court's decision to allow a
claim for a physician's failure to disclose his drug use, that the disclo-
sure standard including life factors would ultimately depend on the
subjective beliefs and standards of the individual involved. 99 If physi-
cians are held to heightened disclosure requirements, perhaps accoun-
tants, lawyers, architects, and other professionals could also be required
to disclose personal information.100
In Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland,0 l1 a physician recom-
mended that a patient have a lump on his penis removed, expressing
concerns about penile cancer. 102 After the operation, the patient was
unable to have intercourse. 103 He claimed that the physician performed
the surgery negligently and that the surgery was unnecessary.104 One of
the grounds of the patient's suit was that the physician had fraudulently
concealed his cocaine use during the time he treated the patient.105 The
court in Albany posed some interesting hypotheticals about the potential
consequences of requiring a physician to disclose drug or alcohol use:
would a physician who one night learns of a parent's illness or who
drinking for religious reasons. Id.
96. Id. at 780.
97. See id. (noting that the patient could use evidence that the physician's drug use caused the
doctor to provide "deficient professional services" to support a medical malpractice claim).
98. Id. at 781-82.
99. Id. At the time this case was decided, Georgia was the only state that did not recognize the
doctrine of informed consent. Ketchup v. Howard, 247 Ga. App. 54, 54 (2000). Georgia provided a
statutory duty for medical providers to disclose the risks of certain procedures, including surgery per-
formed under general, regional, or spinal anesthesia and procedures that involve the injection of a
contrast material. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (Harrison 1998), amended by 2001 Georgia Laws Act 2
(H.B. 107). However, in Ketchup, a Georgia appeals court overruled previous case law and recog-
nized the common law doctrine of informed consent. 247 Ga. App. at 65-66. Albany dealt with the
statutory duty to disclose risks, so it is unclear what effect the recognition of a common law duty of
disclosure would have had on that case. Ketchup, 247 Ga. App. at 65.
100. Lawrence Viele, Disclosure Suit Against Doctor Could Affect Other Professions, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP. (Fulton County, Ga.), Aug. 19, 1999.
101. 528 S.E.2d 777 (Ga. 2000).
102. Id. at 778.
103. Id. The patient suffered a painful curvature of his penis during erections, which made him
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receives divorce papers have a duty to tell her patients?106 The court also
noted the "impossibility of defining which of a professional's life
factors would be subject to such a disclosure requirement."1 07
The dissenting justice, however, observed that the physician in the
case intended that his patients remain unaware of his drug use.108 He
reasoned that informed consent to a procedure includes more than just
consent to the procedure and encompasses the qualifications of the physi-
cian performing it. 109 He was critical of the majority's public policy
argument that defining which of a professional's personal characteristics
would be subject to disclosure would become impossible to limit. 110 The
dissenting justice would have decided the case by focusing only on the
characteristics related to the medical profession and the requirement that
a patient must give consent to the treatment in question.I 1 If the
physician has not provided proper disclosure, then he or she will have
committed a battery.11 2 He countered the majority's argument that what
information a physician would have a duty to disclose would be too
subjective to determine, noting that in Georgia, a physician's license may
be revoked for crimes of moral turpitude or the use of an illegal drug. 113
Therefore, this case did not turn on the subjective beliefs and standards
of a patient because the physician had demonstrably violated both
professional and societal mores.114
In Kaskie v. Wright,' 15 parents sued a physician after their son died
in his surgical care, when they that learned the doctor had alcohol prob-
lems and did not possess a state medical license.116 A Pennsylvania
appeals court considered the parents' claim of a lack of informed con-
sent by examining the traditional informed consent principles: whether
the patient was aware of the material risks of an operation, including its
nature and seriousness, the problem trying to be cured, and the potential
106. Id. at 782 n.19.
107. Id. at 781-82.
108. Id. at 783 (Carley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Id.




114. Id. The dissenting justice noted:
Regardless of where the line ultimately is drawn with regard to a doctor's duty to
disclose in order to avoid civil liability for an unauthorized touching, Dr. Trulock crossed
the line when he obtained Mr. Cleveland's consent without disclosing a factor which
could result in the doctor's criminal prosecution and put his professional license in
jeopardy.
Id.
115. 589 A.2d 213 (Pa. 1991).
116. Id. at 214.
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results.117 However, the court was reluctant to go beyond the traditional
analysis to examine not only the procedure but also the physician
performing it.118
The court noted that matters such as "personal weaknesses and pro-
fessional credentials" should be left to the management of the hospitals
and corporations who employ the physicians.11 9 Thus, the court con-
cluded that any liability for negligence due to the personal qualities or
qualifications should fall on those who hire the physicians. 120 The court
was simply unwilling to extend the doctrine of informed consent that far
beyond its "original boundaries" to the point where the limits defied
definition. 121
In Hidding v. Williams, 122 a Louisiana appeals court reached a con-
trary conclusion regarding a physician's duty to disclose personal life
factors that might affect a patient's treatment. 123 After the patient under-
went lumbar surgery, he experienced a permanent loss of his bowel and
bladder control. 124 The patient sued his physician for negligence and
for failure to disclose both the risk of loss of excretory functions and the
physician's alcohol abuse.125
The court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the physician's
failure to inform the patient of his personal alcohol abuse voided the
surgical consent. 126 The court reasoned that the alcohol abuse created a
material risk relating to the physician's ability to perform the surgery
and that, had the physician disclosed this information, the patient could
have opted for another type of treatment. 127 After reviewing evidence
relating to the physician's heavy drinking habits and drug and alcohol
dependency, the court agreed that the physician's condition increased
the potential for injury and that the failure to disclose that risk violated
informed consent. 128
117. See id, at 216 (noting that without obtaining such consent the physician will be committing a
battery).
118. See id. (questioning whether the court should expand the doctrine to this degree).
119. Id. at 217.
120. Id.
121. See id. (questioning whether patients would have "to be informed of every fact which-might
conceivably affect performance in the surgical suite").
122. 578 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
123. See id. at 1198 (holding that a physician violated the informed consent doctrine by not
disclosing his alcohol abuse to his patient).
124. Id. at 1194.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1196, 1198.
127. Id. at 1196.
128. Id. at 1198. The district court based its decision on medical testimony about alcoholism, testi-
mony from the physician's former wife about his alcohol use, and pleadings from his divorce, which
detailed his substance problems. Id. at 1197. The physician denied having an alcohol problem and
maintained that the medical review board suspended his license on the basis of hearsay. Id.
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Thus, the present case law shows that courts have treated the issue of
whether a patient can claim that a physician's substance abuse voided his
or her consent differently.1 29 Whether a patient will prevail on such a
claim remains a gray area of informed consent.
2. HIV and AIDS Status
Whether physicians have a duty to disclose their Human Immuno-
deficiency Virus (HIV) or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) status to their patients varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 130
A Maryland appeals court acknowledged that, when proper techniques
are used, medical science suggests an extremely low risk of transmitting
HIV during surgery.131 The court did, however, note that the seriousness
of the risk should be evaluated along with the risk's probability.132
Therefore, although the risk of contracting the AIDS virus from a
surgeon is low, if the patient does become infected he or she will almost
certainly die. 133 Cases involving HIV exposure often consist of a patient
who seeks damages for an injury consisting of the fear of contracting
AIDS and the physical symptoms of that fear in the absence of evidence
that he or she actually contracted the disease.134
In Faya v. Almaraz,135 two patients sued the estate of a surgeon who
had operated on them without telling them he was HIV-positive.136
Neither woman could allege that due to some accident or incident during
the operation the AIDS virus had entered their bloodstream.137 The
Maryland appeals court held that even though the patients could not
allege actual transmission of the disease, the patients could recover for
the fear and mental distress they experienced as a result of their anxiety
129. Compare Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 781 (Ga. 2000) (holding
no cause of action for a physician's failure to reveal drug use), with Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d
1192, 1198 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (holding a cause of action exists for a physician's failure to reveal his
alcohol abuse).
130. Compare Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 339 (Md. 1993) (finding that a physician's failure
to disclose HIV status to his patients resulted in a cause of action based on lack of informed consent),
with K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 561-62 (Minn. 1995) (finding that where there are no
compensable damages resulting from the HIV exposure, there can be no claim for nondisclosure).
131. Faya, 620 A.2d at 333.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 174 (Ct. App. 1994). Patients frame their complaints
in a number of ways, but their causes of action may include failure to obtain informed consent, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, battery, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty,
and fraud. Faya, 620 A.2d at 330.
135. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
136. See id. at 333 (noting that while both women alleged multiple counts of misconduct, their
complaints centered on the surgeon's failure to disclose his illness).
137. Id. at 330-31. The lower court, holding that the women had no actionable claim, charac-




about contracting AIDS.138 However, the court limited the women to a
"legitimate window of mental anxiety," noting that they could recover
for the fear and physical manifestations of that fear only for the time
period between learning of the surgeon's illness and learning of their
own HIV-negative test results.139
However, in K.A.C. v. Benson,140 the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that no claim exists when a patient seeks damages solely out of the fear
of contracting AIDS, when the patient demonstrates no actual exposure
to the virus. 141 Both the claim for battery and for negligent nondisclo-
sure failed on the grounds that there were no "compensable damages
recognized by law."142
Cases involving physicians' health status in the areas of HIV and
substance use pose risk management challenges for hospitals. 143 A hospi-
tal may need to take on a greater role in setting internal standards for
informed consent and monitoring physicians' credentials in order to
protect themselves from negligence claims.'n"
3. Qualifications
Another questionable area that has emerged in the sphere of a
physician's personal information is the degree to which a patient has a
right to know about a physician's experience or lack thereof in
performing an operation. 145 Clearly, if a patient asks a physician about
his or her experience with a certain procedure, the physician has a duty
to disclose the information.I4 6 Absent inquiry by a patient, however, the
question has arisen: does a physician have a duty to disclose his or her
experience and qualifications? 4 7
A Washington appeals court has questioned how far this duty would
go because, theoretically, "the physician's own health, financial situa-
138. Id. at 337.
139. Id. at 337, 339. The court noted that medical evidence demonstrated a 95% certainty that a
person will, if infected, test positive for HIV within six months of exposure. Id. at 337 (citing figures
from U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVIcES, VOLUNTARY HIV COuNsELING AND TESTING: FAcTS,
ISSUES, AND ANSWERS (1991)).
140. 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).
141. Id. at 560.
142. Id. at 561.
143. Risk Analysis: Informed Consent, supra note 7, at 4.
144. Id.
145. See II THE PHYSICIAN'S PERSPECTnVE ON MEDICAL LAW 410 (Howard H. Kaufman & Jeff L.
Lewin eds., 1997) (suggesting that patients may be increasingly seeking this type of information).
146. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1972). However, this court reject-
ed the idea that "the patient should ask for information before the physician is required to disclose.
Caveat emptor is not the norm for the consumer of medical services." Id. at 783 n.36.
147. See id. (noting that the "[d]uty to disclose ... is a duty to volunteer, if necessary, the
information the patient needs for [an] intelligent d cision").
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tion, [or] even medical school grades could be considered material facts
a patient would want to consider in consenting to treatment by that physi-
cian." 148 In Whiteside v. Lukson,149 a patient sued her physician after an
operation to remove her gallbladder resulted in numerous complica-
tions. 150 When the patient agreed to undergo the procedure, the physi-
cian did not tell her that he had never performed the procedure on a
person before.151 Although the jury found that the physician's failure
to disclose his experience with the procedure resulted in a failure to
obtain the patient's informed consent, the court granted the physician's
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.152 The court fol-
lowed the "traditional approach" and found that a physician's degree
of experience in performing a particular operation is not a material fact
for liability issues in a claim for failure to obtain informed consent. 153
However, other jurisdictions have found that a physician's experi-
ence regarding a procedure is an element that will demonstrate to the
patient all of the viable treatment options and therefore should be dis-
closed.' 5 4 One patient, after undergoing surgery for an aneurysm which
left her an incomplete quadriplegic, 155 sued her surgeon for failing to
disclose that he had only performed six surgeries for aneurysms after
completing his residency training, and that he had never operated on one
as complex or large as hers. 156
Although the surgeon argued that requiring him to disclose such
information transformed his duty to inform the patient about the risks
of the surgery into a duty to reasonably perform the surgery, the court
disagreed.157 Following jurisdiction precedent regarding the informed
consent statute, the court found that disclosure was not limited by the
plain language of the Wisconsin statute to the disclosure of "the
availability of all alternate, viable medical modes of treatment" and "the
148. Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
149. 947 P.2d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997).
150. Id. at 1264.
151. Id. The physician had learned the procedure by practicing on pigs, but by the time he did
the patient's surgery, he had performed the operation on two other people. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1265; see also Thomas v. Wilfac, Inc., 828 P.2d 597, 601 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (re-
jecting the assertion that the physician was required to inform his patient of his medical qualifications).
154. Johnson by Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Wis. 1996).
155. Id. at 499. After surgery, the patient could not walk or control her excretory functions, and
her vision, speech, and upper body coordination were impaired. Id.
156. Id. at 497, 499.
157. Id. at 504. The surgeon argued that the duty to inform should be thought of as a "bright line
rule" that requires only the disclosure of significant risks attendant to the procedure. Id. The court,
however, followed the reasoning of the Canterbury Court, which stated that in informed consent,
"there is no bright line separating the significant from the insignificant." Id. at 505 (quoting
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
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benefits and risks of these treatments." 158 The court held that along
with personal experience, the physician should have disclosed his risk
statistics, as compared to other surgeons who performed the same
surgery, and the availability of other more capable medical care
providers. 159
B. DUTY TO DISCLOSE FINANCIAL INTERESTS IN A PATIENT'S CARE
An area that has received increasing attention is whether and to what
extent a physician has a duty to disclose financial interests in a patient's
care. 160 Patients who seek to litigate a physician's failure to inform them
of financial interests may have to contend with federal regulations
dealing with health care. 161 The days of a physician practicing medicine
as a sole practitioner on a fee-for-service system have evolved into
physicians who work for larger organizations, such as managed care
groups and sports teams. 162 Exactly what these changes mean for a
physician's obligations of disclosure is gradually being defined through
case law, as illustrated in the following sections.
1. Research Interests
The earliest and best known case involving informed consent and a
breach of a physician's fiduciary duty is Moore v. Regents of the
University of California. 163 The court held that for a physician to obtain
informed consent and satisfy his fiduciary duty, he had to disclose
research or economic personal interests independent from the patient's
health. 164 The patient suffered from leukemia, and the defendant sur-
geon recommended a splenectomy. 165 The surgeon was aware that the
patient's blood contained valuable substances that he could use for
certain scientific and commercial ventures. 166 After obtaining the
patient's consent for surgery, the physician worked with the Regents of
the University of California, a genetics institute, and a pharmaceutical
158. Id. at 501,505 (citing Wis. STAT. § 448.30).
159. Id. at 498.
160. See generally Bobinski, supra note 39, at 301-02.
161. See Krause, supra note 16, at Part IV.C.2 (noting that managed care organizations have
used the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which preempts state laws that relate to
any employer benefit plan, to avoid tort suits by patients).
162. Id. at Part II.A.
163. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). The court noted that a physician who has research interests in a
patient's care runs the risk of having conflicting loyalties that may result in performing tests or
procedures that serve the research interests and not the patient. Id. at 484.
164. Id. at 485.
165. Id. at 481.
166. Id.
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company to create and patent a cell line 167 from the patient's white
blood cells.1 68 The physician retained the patient's spleen after surgery
as well as obtaining other tissue and blood samples over the course of the
next seven years for this purpose. 169
The court reasoned that although informed consent questions
typically occur when a physician does not properly disclose all medical
risks of a procedure, the doctrine could also encompass situations in
which a physician fails to disclose personal interests. 170 The court con-
cluded that when a physician has a research interest in a patient, this
interest could create conflicting loyalties. 171 This conflict is something
that a reasonable patient would want to know about before consenting to
treatment. 172 Even though the patient needed the surgery for legitimate
medical purposes, the physician still had an obligation to inform his
patient about his underlying personal interests. 173 The patient, not the
physician, should determine the true motivations of the physician.174
A recent suit by the parents of children whose genetic material was
used to create a test for Canavan disease presents many of the same
issues as Moore.175 Parents of affected children allowed researchers to
take pieces of their children's brains after they had died in order to
develop a prenatal test for the disease.' 7 6 The hospital where the test was
developed patented the gene, and it began charging royalties as well as
167. Id. at 481-82. One type of Moore's white blood cells overproduced a certain protein in-
volved in regulating the body's immune system, allowing the researchers to more easily identify its
genetic material. Id. at 482 n.2. Once identified, the researchers could isolate the genetic material
and develop a culture or cell line that would continually reproduce. Id.
168. Id. at 480-81.
169. Id. at 480-81. Of the patient's thirteen allegations (conversion, lack of informed consent,
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud and deceit, unjust enrichment, quasi-contract, bad faith breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
misrepresentation, intentional interference with prospective advantageous economic relationships,
slander of title, accounting, and declaratory relief), ultimately, he only succeeded in stating a cause of
action for lack of informed consent and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 482 n.4, 485.
170. Id. at 483. The court in Moore focused on three principles:
First, "a person of adult years and in sound mind has the right, in the exercise of control
over his own body, to determine whether or not to submit to lawful medical treatment."
Second, "the patient's consent to treatment, to be effective, must be an informed con-
sent." Third, in soliciting the patient's consent, a physician has a fiduciary duty to
disclose all information material to the patient's decision.
Id. at 483 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 484.
172. See id. (reasoning that knowing about a conflicting loyalty, as a material element to a
decision for treatment, is a prerequisite to informed consent).
173. Id. at 486.
174. Id. at 485 (citing Cobb v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972)).
175. Peter Gomer, Parents Suing over Patenting of Genetic Test, CHI. TRi., Nov. 19, 2000, at CI.
Affecting mainly Jewish children, Canavan disease is a rare neurological disorder that causes the




limiting the availability of the test. 177 Families who gave tissue samples
are suing for control of the gene on the basis that their rights were vio-
lated by the researchers' actions. 178 The plaintiffs seek to block Miami
Children's Hospital's commercial use of the gene, so those tests can be
given for free once again.179
2. Physician Incentives and Gag-Clauses
In the past, when medicine was largely delivered on a fee-for-service
system, physicians received compensation corresponding to the amount
of services they provided. 180 Informed consent claims of this era tended
to focus on the fact that the physician failed to disclose risks associated
with a certain treatment. 181 However, the delivery of healthcare today
is furnished largely through Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs).182 Providers in HMOs generally receive more compensation
for keeping costs down or, in other words, for providing fewer ser-
vices. 183 Therefore, informed consent actions today have begun to focus
on the physician's failure to adequately inform a patient about certain
treatment options.184
HMOs sometimes use so-called "gag clauses" 185 to control how
their employee physicians deliver medical care and also what informa-
tion they tell their patients.1 86 When physicians are bound by gag-
clauses, patients may allege that because all treatment options were not
presented, the physician breached his or her fiduciary duty. 187 The
American Medical Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
(Council) supports the patient's right to know about a possible conflicts
of interest between patient care and health care costs. 188 The Council has
stated that managed-care physicians have a duty to disclose financial




180. RosoI', supra note 16, § 17.01(2)(d)(i).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id. (postulating that as physicians try to keep costs down they may downplay certain
options that they would rather not, for cost purposes, provide).
184. Id.
185. Krause, supra note 16, at Part III.A. Gag clauses are explicit attempts by managed care
organizations to restrict what treatment options a physician can inform their patients about. Id.
186. See Roger Parloff, The HMO Foes, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 1996, at 80.
187. Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
188. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Ethical.Issues
in Managed Care, 273 J.A.M.A. 330 (Jan. 25, 1995) (stating that both the physician and the managed
care organization have disclosure duties to patients).
189. Id.
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In a suit for non-disclosure or informed consent, physicians will
face more liability than their managed care employers because of fed-
eral preemption in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA).190 Cases in which patients accuse their HMOs and HMO physi-
cians of failing to disclose financial incentives often become enmeshed
in these ERISA preemption issues. 19 1 ERISA has traditionally pre-
empted claims against HMOs due to its regulation of state claims that
relate to healthcare plans and its system of standards for plan providers
and provisions of remedies for plan participants.192 Under ERISA, a
patient cannot have a jury trial or advance a negligence claim, and
recovery is limited to the benefits denied. 193 Because of these restricted
remedies for breaches of fiduciary duty and ERISA's preemption of
state claims challenging a plan's administration, ERISA acts as barrier
for many patients' claims against their HMOs.194 Because the physician
ultimately makes the health care decisions, he or she will most likely
shoulder the responsibility for final determinations regarding treatment,
not the insurer. 195
In Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc.,19 6 a New York District court
dismissed a class action suit by patients who claimed that their HMO
breached its fiduciary obligations under ERISA by failing to disclose its
physician compensation arrangements.197 Although the patients argued
that the financial arrangements in question would cause physicians to
breach their ethical duties to patients, the court found this argument too
speculative to support a cause of action. 198 The court did, however, allow
the patients' claim to move forward on the allegations that the HMO ex-
ercised inappropriate discretionary authority over what medical informa-
tion the physicians could reveal to patients. 199 The court noted that "a
190. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). A New York appeals court held that a medical
malpractice claim based on a physician's delay in treating a patient, which ultimately led to his death,
in order to refer the patient to an out-of-plan specialist was not preempted by ERISA. Nealy v. US
Healthcare HMO, 711 N.E.2d 621, 622-23 (N.Y. 1999). Although the plaintiffs cause of action was
related to a patient's treatment under a managed care organization, the physician could not escape
liability under ERISA by construing his actions as relating to plan administration. Id. at 625.
191. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 233-35 (2000).
192. David Schultz & Tracey Galinson, Suits Against Managed Care Providers May Elude
ERISA, NAT'L LAW J. (July 6, 1998), at B9
193. Krause, supra note 16, at Part IV.C.2.
194. Id.
195. Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. App. 1986) (noting that the physician must ad-
vocate for the best interest of his or her patient even in the face of intimidation by an insurer). In this
case, the patient was insured through the California medical assistance program. Id. at 812.
196. 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
197. Id. at 753. The court noted that if Congress had intended a disclosure requirement of physi-
cian compensation arrangements, it could have outlined such a requirement in an ERISA provision.
Id. at 754.
198. Id. at 752.
199. Id. at 751.
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physician has an independent duty to provide full information to his or
her patients, a duty which 'is not altered by limitations in the coverage
provided by the patient's managed care plan."' 200 Thus, if proven, the
alleged gag-clauses, which restricted a physician's ability to tell a patient
about non-covered treatments, were held to constitute a breach of the
HMO's duty under ERISA to manage the health plan "solely in the
interest of the participants." 201
In Shea v. Esensten (Shea J),202 a patient died after suffering a heart
attack. 203 Although the patient had recently visited his primary care
physician and presented symptoms of heart problems, including a family
history of cardiac trouble, the physician did not refer him to a cardiolo-
gist.204 The patient's widow sued the HMO her husband belonged to for
failing to disclose the financial incentive system it provided to its physi-
cians to minimize referrals to specialists. 205 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed that knowledge of financial incen-
tives that affect a physician's decisions to refer patients to specialists is
material information requiring disclosure, and it reversed the lower
court's dismissal of the claim for breaching a fiduciary duty.2 0
6
In Shea v. Esensten (Shea II),207 the patient's widow pursued her
claim of negligent misrepresentation against the physicians for failure to
disclose their conflict of interest under their contract with the HMO.208
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the
district court's dismissal of the misrepresentation claim as preempted by
ERISA.209 The court held that allowing the tort claim to proceed against
the physicians would not impact any element of the ERISA plan.
2 10
Furthermore, Minnesota professional ethical standards mandate a disclo-
200. Id. (quoting Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Ethical
Issues in Managed Care, Council Report, 273 J.A.M.A. 330 (Jan. 25, 1995)).
201. Id. at 751.
202. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
203. Id. at 626.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 627. According to the patient's widow, if the patient had known of the incentives
designed to minimize referrals, he would have seen a specialist on his own accord. Id.
206. Id. at 627-28. The court stated that a "patient necessarily relies on the doctor's advice about
treatment options, and the patient must know whether the advice is influenced by self-serving financial
considerations created by the health insurance provider." Id. at 628.
207. 208 F.3d 712 (8th Cir. 2000).
208. Id. at 715-16. The complaint was originally brought as a state tort action, but the defendants,
the managed care organization, moved the case to federal district court. Id. at 715; see also Shea, 107
F.3d at 627. In the state claim, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's refusal to
admit evidence regarding the managed care incentives. Shea v. Esensten, 622 N.W.2d 130, 132
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001). The court stated there was no evidence to link the incentives to patient care.
Id. at 135-36.
209. Shea, 208 F.3d at 718-19.
210. Id. at 718.
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sure of conflicts of interest. 211 Thus, a patient who files suit against an
HMO for the failure to disclose the financial physician incentives and
gag-clauses will have to deal with the challenges that ERISA presents. 212
3. Pharmaceutical Kickbacks
Another informed consent issue involves physicians who accept
compensation from pharmaceutical companies for prescribing certain
prescription drugs. 2 13 In D.A.B. v. Brown,214 the government indicted a
doctor for participating in a scheme to prescribe patients a growth
hormone drug in return for compensation from the drug distributor, and
six patients and their parents sued the doctor for failing to disclose the
kickback arrangement. 215 Although the patients claimed that the physi-
cian should be held liable for breaching the law of fiduciaries and for
statutory fraud, the Minnesota appellate court found that the doctor's
duty to disclose the compensation scheme meant the case should be ana-
lyzed in terms of informed consent.2 16 The court declined to recognize
a new tort based on the breach of fiduciary duty to encompass the acts
of a physician who receives compensation for prescribing a product.2 17
Although the court recognized that a physician should provide advice to
patients without "self-serving financial considerations," any breach of
fiduciary duty emerges from the doctor-patient relationship, and a
complaint properly arises from that medical care. 218
4. Team Physicians
In Krueger v. San Francisco Forty-Niners,219 a professional football
player sued his former employer after relying on the treatment and ad-
vice of the team doctors relating to an injured knee that left him with a
permanent, crippling arthritic condition.2 20 After injuring his knee while
playing football, the patient received treatments, designed to decrease the
211. Id. at 717.
212. See, e.g., Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
213. D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
214. 570 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
215. Id. at 169. The patients also sued the manufacturer and the distributor of the drug. Id.
216. See id. at 171 (noting that because the heart of the scheme involved the medical diagnosis,
treatment, and care of patients, the complaint must be framed as one for medical malpractice).
217. See id. (stating that to hold otherwise would permit every malpractice action to be pleaded
as a breach of fiduciary duty and circumvent the statute of limitations for malpractice claims).
218. See id. at 172 (noting that the patient's complaint would fail as a malpractice claim because
it alleged no actual injury and because the events occur beyond the statute of limitations).
219. 234 Cal. Rptr. 579 (Ct. App. 1987). This case was ordered not published. Under Rule
977(a)(1) of the California Rules of Court, the opinion has persuasive, but not precedential, value.
220. Id. at 581-82. Charles Krueger played for the San Francisco Forty-Niners from 1958 to
1973, during which time he suffered from numerous injuries; however, only the injury to his knee was
at issue in this suit. Id. at 580.
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pain and swelling, from the team doctors who failed to advise him of the
potential risks associated with the treatments. 22 1 After being hit in a
game, a piece of the patient's knee broke off and dislodged in the
joint. 222 However, the team doctors never informed him that by continu-
ing to play he risked permanent knee damage. 223
In the patient's suit against the team for fraudulent concealment, the
court found that the physicians failed to make full disclosure as to the
patient's condition. 224 The physician claimed that he did not conceal
any information from the patient and that he believed the patient knew
the extent of his injury. 225 However, the court focused, not on whether
the physicians had withheld any information from the patient, but rather
whether they had failed to make a complete disclosure of his condi-
tion. 226 The court stated that the physician's claim that he did not pur-
posely withhold any information from his patient was not an excuse for
failing to make a complete disclosure. 227 Noting that no evidence was
presented that the patient had ever received information regarding the
risks of continuing to play on his damaged knee, the court found that
the physicians failed to make adequate disclosure to the patient.22
8
The patient, in order to satisfy the elements for fraudulent conceal-
ment, had to establish that the defendants concealed the information in
order to induce the plaintiff to perform or to abandon a course of
action.229 The court found that the patient established that the team had
a compelling financial interest in keeping the patient playing football,
which satisfied the intent requirement. 230 The court held that the patient
221. Id. at 581. The physicians aspirated the fluid from the knee and then injected cortisone and
novocaine into the knee; however, the patient was never advised that repeated treatments could lead
to knee damage. See id.
222. Id.
223. Id. Although the trial court found that the patient would have continued to play football
even if he had known the severity of the injury, the appeals court considered this conjecture and ac-
cepted the patient's testimony that, had he known of his condition, he would have retired. Id. at 583,
585.
224. See id. at 583. Compare id. with Sherwin v. Indianapolis Colts, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 1172, 1179
(N.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing a similar claim for fraud and negligent misrepresentation by a profession-
al football player because it was subject to arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement
between the National Football League Players Association and the National Football League
Management Council).
225. Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
226. Id. The court noted that "[a] physician cannot avoid responsibility for failure to make full
disclosure by simply claiming that information was not withheld." Id.
227. Id. at 584.
228. Id. at 583-84.
229. Id. at 584. The case considers the duties of both the San Francisco Forty-Niners and the
physicians together, apparently because the team's medical staff was treating him. Id. at 583.
230. Id. at 584.
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was entitled to rely on the physicians to make a full disclosure of
medical information.231
Thus, a team physician has a duty to disclose relevant medical
information to team members. 232 A sports player is entitled to rely on
the physician's advice without concern that the physician is placing the
team's interest above patient care.233 This duty would likely apply to
school sports as well as professional sports.
2 34
IV. INFORMED CONSENT: LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Some state legislatures have passed laws requiring managed care
organizations to disclose physician reimbursement information to
patients, 235 and the federal government has expressed concern about the
use of financial incentives in the health care industry.236 The North
Dakota legislature has acted to protect the physician-patient relationship
from encroachment by HMOs' contractual provisions that might harm a
patient. 237 These protections extend to protecting the communications
between the patient and physician from interference by the plan provid-
er,238 prohibiting incentives to health care providers to withhold medical-
ly needed treatment, 239 and prohibiting health insurance providers from
231. Id.
232. See Matthew J. Mitten, Annotation, Medical Malpractice Liability of Sports Medicine Care
Providers for Injury to, or Death of, Athlete, 33 A.L.R. 5th 619, § 4(d), at 635 (noting that in actions
against team physicians for lack of disclosure, traditional principles of informed consent apply).
233. Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
234. See Margaret Cronin Fisk, New Century, New Causes, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 27, 2000, at Al.
235. See Bobinski, supra note 39, at 323-25; see also Krause, supra note 16, at 371 ("By the end
of 1998, most states had enacted laws banning the existence of such clauses in MCO [managed care
organizations] contracts, and otherwise addressing perceived impediments to patient (and provider)
rights.").
236. Bobinski, supra note 39, at 323-24 (noting that the federal government has enacted some
protections for Medicaid and Medicare patients).
237. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-04-02 (1995) (unfair methods of competition or unfair and decep-
tive acts or practices prohibited). The prohibited practices are defined in section 26.1-04-03 of the
North Dakota Century Code.
238. Id. § 26.1-04-03(15)(a) (Supp. 1999) (Interference with certain medical communications).
The code provides:
An entity offering a health plan may not restrict or interfere with any medical communi-
cation and may not take any of the following actions against a health care provider solely
on the basis of a medical communication:
(1) Refusal to contract with the health care provider;
(2) Termination of or refusal to renew a contract with the health care provider;
(3) Refusal to refer patients to or allow others to refer patients to the health care
provider; or
(4) Refusal to compensate the health care provider for covered services that are
medically necessary.
Id.
239. Id. § 26.1-04-03(17) (Supp. 1999) (incentives to withhold medically necessary care). The
code states:
An entity may not offer a health care provider, and a contract with a health care
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retaliating against a health care provider who advocates for a patient.240
As the issues surrounding informed consent and the disclosure of
managed care information continue to result in litigation, legislatures
may enact more statutes further defining the way in which managed care
providers disseminate information to their patients.
241
The benefits of a patient being fully informed must be balanced
with practical considerations. 242 In an effort to provide patients with
access to information about hospitals and HMOs, New York recently
passed legislation that requires the release of "report cards" to the pub-
lic. 243 For HMOs, these report cards will detail information about the
satisfaction and enrollment of members, certification rates of physicians,
and access to services. 244  Because many of the schemes for paying
physicians in managed care organizations are very complex, one must
question whether providing this information will truly inform patients.
245
One should not forget that the reason HMOs have become so prevalent is
because, as health care costs continually rise, HMOs help keep those
costs down.
246
Some states have enacted laws that make physician profiles available
to patients over the Internet or by toll free numbers. 247 These profiles
typically contain factual data, medical malpractice claims, disciplinary
history, and criminal history. 248 Advocates of these publicly available
profiles assert that unless a patient knows this type of information, he or
she cannot really make an informed decision to consent to treatment.
249
provider under a health plan may not contain, an incentive plan that includes a specific
payment made to, or withheld from, the provider as an inducement to deny, reduce, limit,
or delay medically necessary care covered by the health plan and provided with respect
to a patient. This subsection does not prohibit incentive plans, including capitation
payments or shared-risk arrangements, that are not tied to specific medical decisions
with respect to a patient....
Id.
240. Id. § 26.1-04-03(18) (Supp. 1999). This statute protects a health care provider who advo-
cates for a patient in an insurance program or procedure or who reports a health insurance provider
for endangering a patient. Id. The health insurance provider cannot refuse to contract with the health
care provider, terminate or refuse to renew a contract, refuse to allow the patient to be referred, or
refuse to compensate the health care provider. Id.
241. See Bobinski, supra note 39, at 359-60.
242. See Henry T. Greely, Direct Financial Incentives in Managed Care: Unanswered
Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 53, 82 (1996).
243. See Kenneth N. Rashbaum & Hannah K. Kiernan, The Patient Health Information and Quali-
ty Improvement Act of 2000: Health Care Consumer Beware-or Befuddled?, MEALEY'S MANAGED
CARE LIABILITY REP., Dec. 8, 2000 (citing N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2995-a (Consol. 2000)).
244. Id.
245. Greely, supra note 242, at 82.
246. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 218-19 (2000) (providing a general background on
HMOs).
247. Rashbaum & Kiernan, supra note 243. These states include Massachusetts, New York,




NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
However, critics respond that this data may be misleading. 250 For ex-
ample, the New York law requires a listing of settlement claims by num-
ber of claims, meaning that a patient would not know the circumstances
surrounding the case. 251 It also lists any criminal convictions, including
those unrelated to the practice of medicine. 252 Whether these profiles
will truly inform a patient or merely give him or her a clouded picture of
a physician is yet unclear. 253 The conflict between the privacy of a
physician and the right of a patient to be informed of all of the relevant
facts related to his or her treatment will likely develop into judicial
challenges in the future.254
V. CONCLUSION
The idea that a doctor has something other than the best interests of
his or her patients at heart goes directly to the core of the theories
behind informed consent.255 A patient should be able to receive advice
from his or her doctor without wondering what ulterior motive the
doctor may have for providing or not providing that advice. 256 At the
same time, society must ask how much information a patient needs to
truly be informed. 257 Will doctors be required to fill out questionnaires
detailing aspects of their personal and professional lives? 258 It is
necessary to strike a balance between a patient who is adequately
informed and a doctor who is not so busy worrying about disclosure that
he or she cannot practice medicine. As medical care becomes in many
ways more depersonalized, these issues have the potential to make a




251. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2995-a (Consol. 2000). But see MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
112, § 5 (West Supp. 2001) (listing settlement claims in graduated categories that indicate the
significance of the claims).
252. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2995-a. But see MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, §5 (listing
only felonies and serious misdemeanors).
253. Rashbaum & Kiernan, supra note 243.
254. Id.
255. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990).
256. Id. at 484-85.
257. Cf. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court proclaimed that
"[tihere is no bright line separating the significant from the insignificant: the answer in any case must
abide by a rule of reason." Id. at 788.
258. Cf. id. at 788. In Canterbury, the court found answers to the gray areas of disclosure by
reasoning that "[w]henever nondisclosure of particular risk information is open to debate by
reasonable-minded men, the issue is for the finder of facts." Id.
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